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ABSTRACT
The objective of this article is to explore how the mobility power of nurses (the ability to move 
between employers or leave the labor market) contributes to changing relations between health 
institutions and temporary work agencies in the Norwegian welfare state. Based on case study as 
the research strategy, the article contributes to the political economy of labor relations approach 
and the debate over the role of TWAs and temporary nursing in the health sector. The mobility 
power of Swedish nurses who shift from agency nursing to direct temporary nursing in health insti-
tutions (bank nursing) partly explains the constrained growth of agency nursing in the Norwegian 
hospital sector. However, contracting flows of Swedish nurses to Norway since 2015 challenge 
internal labor hire and could make health institutions more agency-dependent in future. The data 
employed are semi-structured interviews, official statistics, reports, and news clippings.
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Introduction
Health institutions in many countries suffer from nurse shortages and temporary work agencies (TWAs) have gained a foothold in this part of the labor market (Jansson & Engstrøm 2017; OECD 2015; Purcell et al. 2004; Seo & Spetz 2014). 
Research on TWAs tend to focus on either the relationship between the client firms 
and TWAs in light of the client firms’ need of flexible labor (see Svalund 2018) or the 
experiences of agency workers, such as the effects of agency work on their work–life bal-
ance, opportunities for permanent employment, or precariousness at work (De Ruyter 
et al. 2008, Gottfried 1992; Tailby 2005). However, in line with the political economy 
of employment relations approach, both client firms and TWAs are embedded in con-
tingent relationships with each other and with labor and these relationships have to be 
understood in the political, regulatory, and economic contexts that they take place (Coe 
et al. 2009; Jordhus-Lier et al. 2015; Purcell et al. 2004). 
The objective of this article is to explore how the mobility power of registered 
nurses (hereafter ‘nurses’) contributes to changing relations between health institutions 
and TWAs in the Norwegian welfare state. Briefly put, ‘mobility power’ refers to the abil-
ity of labor to move between employers or leave the labor market (below). Labor can use 
its mobility power to pressure for better conditions by both threatened and actual exit 
from the workplace (Smith 2006). The article thus contributes to the political economy 
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of labor relations approach. It does not only bring labor as sentient beings into the anal-
ysis, but it also puts labor and its mobility power at the center stage and explores what 
new insights this angle brings to nurse staffing in the health sector. The theme is actual-
ized by signs of constrained growth of agency nursing and greater emphasis on bank 
nursing (internal labor hire) and personnel pools in Norway (Aanerud 2015; Brand-
shaug 2017; the Health Enterprises’ Procurement Service, HINAS, in Dolonen 2018; SSB 
2011–2014; SSB 2015–2017; Stavanger Aftenblad 2010). This changing relationship 
between health institutions and TWAs will form the empirical backbone of the analysis. 
The concept of bank nursing requires operationalization. In a case study of the UK 
National Health Service (NHS), bank nursing refers to internal hire of temporary nurses 
by NHS trusts as on-call or casual workers, whereas agency nursing refers to external 
hire of nurses from commercial agencies (Tailby 2005). In the case study from Norway, 
the respondents never used the term bank nursing, but (personnel) pools. They operated 
with different types of pools and there could even be a pool of permanently employed 
nurses to be shifted between wards. In the analysis, the concept of bank nurses only 
applies to internal hire of temporary nurses; whether on-call or casual; and whether 
initially recruited by the staffing center or a ward. Any nurse hired on a temporary basis 
had to sign a contract with the hospital staffing center.
There seems to be few in-depth studies addressing TWAs as providers of temporary 
nurses in countries other than the UK and the USA. Both countries are characterized by 
liberal industry regulation and liberal labor market regulation with relatively few con-
straints on the TWAs (Coe et al. 2009). A case study from the Norwegian welfare state 
can thus shed further light on accessing nurses through TWAs. The Norwegian welfare 
system is universalistic and generous. Income tax and full employment are important to 
finance the system, as is full employment to reduce the costs of it. Industrial relations are 
tripartite with centralized mechanisms of wage-setting, strong unions, and a compressed 
wage structure. Similar to Sweden, but unlike the UK and the USA, Norway combines 
a highly regulated labor market with liberal industrial regulation (Coe et al. 2009; 
Knutsen 2014). 
In Norway, private employment exchange and contracting out of labor was not 
legalized until 2000 and permanent employment is the ‘rule’ as stated in Lovdata 
(2014). Furthermore, the Norwegian health sector is primarily a public sector.1 Nurses 
are important in providing health services at the level that the population expects from 
the welfare state, and welfare services at this level are in turn important to maintain the 
welfare state. These factors may constrain agency nursing and affect whether and how 
nurses resort to mobility power.
Addressing the objective of the article, the analysis is structured around three 
research questions and a transversal theme: First, what experiences motivate the nurses 
for agency nursing and bank nursing and how do they use their mobility power in this 
respect? Second, how do health institutions experience agency nursing and how does 
this affect their strategies to access nurses? Third, how do the TWAs respond to the strat-
egies of the health institutions and the mobility power of nurses and what could be the 
implications of this for nurse staffing in the health sector? The context-specific factors in 
Norway affecting motivations and action is the transversal theme. 
The analytical framework presents previous literature on why health institutions 
resort to agency nursing and bank nursing and how TWAs may respond. I then explain 
the concept of mobility power and how I am going to use it in the analysis. After 
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presenting the methods, I turn to the Norwegian case. I start with a short background 
section on the labor market for nurses and the available data on the constrained growth 
of agency nursing. After analyzing the experiences and mobility power of the nurses, I 
continue with how health institutions experience agency nursing, their internal measures 
to deal with nurse shortages, and implications of this for their relations with the TWAs. 
The last part of the analysis addresses how TWAs consider their relationship to the 
health institutions and respond to the nurses’ mobility power. The conclusions sum up 
the main empirical findings, noting what insights the analytical framework incorporat-
ing attention to mobility power and the Norwegian welfare state can contribute. 
Analytical framework
Previous studies
Agency nursing from the angle of the health institutions
Achieving numerical flexibility by externalizing employment relations to cut costs 
has not only gained considerable attention in the lower end of the labor market (see 
Berglund et al. 2017), but also in the high-skill end of the labor market, agency nurses 
are hired to ensure numerical flexibility and reduce costs (Houseman et al. 2003; Seo & 
Spetz 2014). 
Houseman et al. (2003) showed that agency nurses in the US health sector covered 
for workload variability, absences, and temporary vacancies. The health sector also turns 
to TWAs to deal with nursing shortages as a long-term and structural problem of recruit-
ment and retention (Purcell et al. 2004). Statistical data from California 1996–2002 
revealed increasing demand for agency nurses during periods of nursing shortages. 
Demand rose with the number of patients cared for and increases in patient-care demand 
and the level of benefits paid to regular staff (Seo & Spetz 2014). Elsewhere in the USA, 
health managers did not find agency nursing cost-effective, and they expressed quality 
concerns about this type of nursing. Several hospitals reduced their use of agency nurses 
and turned instead to bank nurses. These received higher wages than regular staff, but 
less than agency nurses (May et al. 2006). Similarly, a case study of the NHS in the UK 
shows that bank nursing escalated in the 1990s as an alternative to agency nursing, due 
primarily to the high cost of agency nursing (Purcell et al. 2004). However, the NHS still 
spends large amounts on high-cost agency nursing (Royal College of Nursing & HCL 
nursing 2016).
A quantitative study of agency staffing (nurse aides, licensed practical nurses, and 
registered nurses) in US nursing homes found that health managers saw more disad-
vantages than advantages (Castle 2009). The most frequently reported disadvantages 
included higher expenses for and lower productivity of agency staff than regular staff, 
the need for supervision of agency staff, disruption of ward routines; psychological dis-
tress, lack of continuity of care, and practices unfamiliar to residents. Agency staffing 
was deemed advantageous as regards staffing levels and being able to obtain personnel 
as and when required. These findings are in line with previous studies of agency staff-
ing in hospitals and nursing homes (see Castle 2009). In a qualitative study at a Swed-
ish hospital, agency nurses were characterized as competent, ambitious, generous, and 
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social, and important for relieving regular nurses of the burdens of overtime and extra 
work. However, agency nurses also increased the workload of the regular nurses, who 
are the ones that know the routines, procedures, and equipment in the unit (Jansson & 
Engström 2017).
Contrary to the conventional discourse on agency work, several studies contest 
that flexibility by agency nursing is cost-effective, but they argue that agency nursing 
is important to ensure ‘adequate’ staffing levels. Bank nursing is preferable because it 
offers flexibility at a lower cost. How the preferences of the nurses affect staffing strate-
gies is not a topic in the above studies, except for Purcell et al. (2004). 
Agency nursing from the angle of the nurses 
Nurses use agency nursing to earn higher wages and escape a stressful working life with 
increasing workloads, pressures to work extra hours, and inconvenient shifts in regular 
employment. First, agency nurses can work closer to patients than regular staff. Second, 
they are exempted from many tasks related to routines and longer-term planning and 
development in the units where they are placed. Third, they can more easily distance 
themselves psychologically from patients and workplaces when the workday is over 
(De Ruyter et al. 2008; Jansson & Engström 2017; Tailby 2005). Moreover, agency 
nursing can be a strategy to obtain a better work–life balance and a strategy when career 
prospects in regular employment are limited (Tailby 2005). These factors reflect negative 
experiences with regular employment and that agency nursing can be a result of finan-
cial and stress-related need.
Previous studies also accentuate the downside of agency nursing. Unpredictabil-
ity regarding access to work, where and what type of institution to work for next, 
and short-notice assignments make agency nursing stressful (De Ruyter et al. 2008). 
Dual control by managers in the workplace and managers in the TWA adds to this 
(Gottfried 1992): Agency nurses feel that they must continually make their contribu-
tions and results visible in the workplace to get their contract renewed, and fear that 
their TWA manager may not be informed about their achievements (Cicellin et al. 2015). 
Other studies show that agency nurses feel themselves looked down upon by regular 
nurses and that they get more difficult workloads, having to take shifts and tasks unpop-
ular among regular staff (Cicellin et al. 2015; Royal College of Nursing & HCL Nursing 
2016). Thus, nurses who want more predictable work than agency nursing and tasks 
closer to their original areas of expertise often find bank nursing preferable to agency 
nursing (Tailby 2005; Zampoukos et al. 2018). 
The strategies of TWAs
TWAs have been studied as strategic and profit-seeking actors and powerful agents of 
labor market liberalization (Jordhus-Lier et al. 2015; Peck et al. 2005), taking advan-
tage of and seeking to influence the regulatory context where they operate. Studying the 
global expansion of TWAs, Coe and colleagues explore ‘the agency of the agencies’ in 
relation to how national temporary staffing markets are produced in varying regulatory 
contexts (Coe et al. 2010, p. 1058; Jordhus-Lier et al. 2015). Unlike the UK and the 
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USA, TWAs in the welfare state of Sweden have not been able to expand in the ways 
they would like, being subject to high entry barriers and a ‘heavily regulated mainstream 
labor market’ (Coe et al. 2009, p. 81). The largest TWAs, however, have been able to 
grow and protect their market shares within this context. 
Studies of the agency of agencies in the health sector are difficult to find. The study 
of Purcell et al. (2004) is an important exception. When combining agency nursing with 
regular nursing became attractive to regular nurses in the UK, this exacerbated the prob-
lem of internal staffing. The NHS introduced bank nursing to reduce its dependence on 
TWAs and curb costs (Tailby 2005). Purcell et al. (2004) found the TWA that they studied 
vulnerable to the strategies of the NHS but able to adapt to shifting conditions, seeking 
‘to meet and influence the expectations of the temps’ and ‘obtain social legitimacy to 
ensure acceptance and survival’ (2004, p. 706). The TWA thereby deepened its relation-
ship (2004, p. 719) with the nurses, providing facilities for training and career advice, 
offering paid training and shared facilities with the nurses’ union. Attempting to become 
‘indispensable to major employers’, it focused on supplying specialist nurses for short-
term assignments (2004, p. 706). The findings inspire further research on the agency 
(capacity to act in their own interest) of the nurses in their relations with the TWAs and 
health institutions. Conceptualization of mobility power is an entry point for such studies.
Mobility power
Drawing on labor process theory, Smith (2006) introduces the concept of ‘mobility 
power’ in relation to the struggle between capital and labor and the double indetermi-
nacy (uncertainties) of labor as willful agents. Within the capitalist system, employers 
strive for higher surplus values and higher and newer forms of work intensification. 
This requires compliance and consent by labor, and is a source of struggle between 
capital and labor. Labor power is seen as consisting of two elements: power over work 
efforts, and power to move between firms (mobility power). These are the sources of 
work-effort indeterminacy and mobility-effort indeterminacy (Smith 2006). In its role 
of employer in the public sector, the state represents capital.
Work-effort indeterminacy concerns struggles over factors like wages, working con-
ditions, and work-pace. At the analytical level addressing the agency of the actors, the 
struggles are divided into work-effort bargaining and mobility-effort bargaining. Work-
effort bargaining is expressed in acts such as go-slow and withdrawal of commitment, 
collectively organized by actors such as work groups or the trade union. Employers meet 
this with increased stringency and control (Smith 2006).
Mobility-effort bargaining takes the forms of withdrawal, threatened exit, and 
increased job search. These acts are mainly individual and informal. Workers can 
threaten to quit, seeking to achieve better workplace conditions, or may exit to escape 
problems. At this level of analysis, mobility power refers to the ability of workers to 
move between firms. To weaken the mobility power, employers may try to retain work-
ers, for example, by rewards and career developments that increase the cost of leaving. 
While firm-specific skills that cannot be applied elsewhere might raise the cost of leav-
ing, building skill-depleted jobs could make it easier for the employer to access larger 
labor markets. Using agency workers is another option for managing mobility when 
there are problems in securing enough permanent staff (Smith 2006).
30 Health Institutions, Temporary Work Agencies Hege Merete Knutsen
Work-effort bargaining and mobility-effort bargaining largely overlap Hirschman’s 
(1970) conceptualization of voice and exit and the way this actor-based approach is 
applied in management studies (see Kiil & Knutsen 2016). In short, exit may follow 
if voice does not succeed, and threatened exit lies in the borderline between voice and 
exit. Similarly, in the mobility-power approach, high labor turnover and threatened exit 
strengthen the leverage of workers in work-effort bargaining. The same applies to short-
age of labor, which makes recruitment difficult. The article thus applies a broad concept 
of mobility power adding the ability to leave the labor market. 
An advantage of the mobility-power approach is that it is more concerned with 
what workers may achieve collectively for themselves than the Hirschman-approach 
(Kiil & Knutsen 2016). It is, however, important to note that power to exit does not 
necessarily lead to a positive outcome for the workers. Neither the mobility-power 
approach nor the Hirschman-approach are concerned with what those who leave the 
workplace obtain for themselves. 
Wright (2000) and Silver (2003) distinguish between the structural power and the 
associational power of labor. Mobility power (Smith 2006), which is based on demand 
and supply in the labor market, is a form of structural power. Associational power is 
based on efforts and support initiated by organizations and alliances. Work-effort bar-
gaining (Smith 2006) can benefit from associational power when actions are collectively 
initiated, for instance by trade unions. Whereas Smith (2006) acknowledges that quit-
ting can be a source of conflict involving a number of actors, the trade union among 
them, he does not delve into how mobility power and associational power may affect 
each other, which will be addressed in the analysis. 
Low wages and poor working conditions among nurses have led to a surge in 
unionization. However, militant actions and strikes as elements of voice have to a large 
extent been regarded incompatible with their professional work, which requires them to 
hold back on resentments and emotions. Strikes among nurses are also often restricted 
by regulation (Bergene & Egeland 2016; Kiil & Knutsen 2016). This makes nursing a 
particularly interesting occupation for the study of how mobility power affects the rela-
tionships between TWAs and client institutions. 
Methods
This article employs case study as the research strategy (Yin 2014), and uses data col-
lected for the research project ‘The impact of temporary work agencies on the politics 
of work’, funded by The Research Council of Norway, Ref. 227021/H-20. The data 
material consists of 36 semi-structured interviews conducted between June 2014 and 
August 2017, comprising altogether 43 respondents.2 Interviews were conducted in 
five hospitals (eight managers and three nurse leaders), and five nursing homes (five 
managers), at Hospital Partner (one manager), three Norwegian TWAs (six managers), 
and with 20 Swedish nurses. Swedish nurses are the largest group of foreign nurses in 
Norway. 
Only in one TWA and one hospital, two or more managers and leaders were inter-
viewed together. The interviews lasted between half an hour and more than two hours, 
most of them exceeded one hour. The nurses were recruited through professional net-
works, Facebook and the Internet, and by help of the snowball method. Most of the 
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nurses, two of the hospital managers, the manager at Hospital Partner, and three of the 
managers in the nursing homes were interviewed by telephone. Telephone interviews, 
sometimes followed up with e-mail correspondence, functioned well judging from the 
amount and relevance of the data obtained.
The health institutions were asked about challenges they face in terms of staffing, 
the internal solutions they resort to and experiences with these, and their experiences 
with agency nursing. The nurses were asked about their migration history, their expe-
riences with temporary work, both for TWAs and for the health institutions directly, 
and how they respond to what they perceive as inferior employment and working 
conditions.
The TWAs were asked about how they access nurses and the employment condi-
tions they offer, their experiences catering to hospitals and nursing homes, respectively, 
what the health institutions and nurses require from them, and experiences of being 
included in and operating outside the HINAS agreement.3 HINAS was established in 
2003 by the regional health enterprises to coordinate procurement of goods and services 
for the hospital sector. The HINAS agreement dating back to 2009 is a national frame-
work agreement with selected TWAs on labor hire to the hospital sector. The objective 
is to curb escalating costs and ensure high-quality services. 
The interview data are supplemented with official statistics, reports, and news clip-
pings. The interviews have been analyzed manually, each transcript critically examined 
several times searching for differences in the experiences of the various categories of 
actors and how this relates to the secondary data sources and the literature review. 
References to the individual respondents below are intentionally vague, as they were 
promised anonymity. TWAs and health institutions are not numbered to prevent that 
cross referencing might reveal their identity. 
The Norwegian case
Background
While the health sector employs some 95,000 nurses (SSB, 2016),4 it is currently short of 
4000 nurses, including 400 specialist nurses (NAV 2017). By 2035, the nursing shortage 
may be as high as 28 000 (Stølen & Texmon 2012). It is difficult to recruit nurses to fill 
vacancies, and there is a need for substitute nurses to cover for sickness absence, parental 
leave, and holiday seasons when many permanent staff are on leave (Berge et al. 2011; 
Gautun et al. 2016).
Wages for nurses are low compared to other economic sectors in Norway; there 
is under-staffing and inconvenient shifts and rota work.5 Another disincentive is the 
difficulty for many nurses in getting full-time positions because of shift-work techni-
calities. About half of Norway’s permanently employed nurses hold part-time posi-
tions (The Research Council of Norway 2014). Moreover, many specialist nurses are 
due for retirement 2015–2025, but not enough new specialist nurses are being trained 
(Dolonen 2015).
Based on the interviews with the nurse leaders in the hospitals and the nursing-
home managers, nurses use their mobility power: Some leave unattractive workplaces 
for workplaces with better conditions and some leave the profession. One of five nurses 
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trained in 2004 was not working in the health sector ten years later (Skjøstad et al. 2017). 
Agency nursing is one of the strategies the health institutions resort to in the tight labor 
market.
Constrained growth of agency nursing
After the legalization of private employment exchange and contracting out of labor in 
2000, agency nursing reached a peak of more than 3000 nurses in 2009. The number 
declined to 1566 in 2014, and further down to 1309 in 2016 (Berge et al. 2011; SSB 
2015–2017).6 However, these figures do not indicate the full significance of the TWA 
sector in the Norwegian labor market for nurses. First, the statistics cover only nurses in 
TWAs that operate offices in Norway. Second, the data refer to a representative week in 
November, and not in the summer, when the demand for substitutes is highest. Although 
the TWAs report on education not occupation, one may assume that the TWAs supply 
‘so to say, all of them’ to the health sector (manager, TWA). 
Figures from Hospital Partner on the number of hours worked by agency nurses in 
the hospital sector as part of the HINAS agreement indicate a recent decline in the use of 
agency nurses but to a lesser extent than the number of agency nurses above. The num-
ber of hours increased from 559,568 to 668,558 for 2010–2013, gradually declining 
to 496,157 in 2016 (Ministry of Health and Social Care 2016; Hospital Partner 2017). 
Expenditure on agency nursing reached NOK 436 million (Euro 48 million) in 2016 and 
has been stable from 2013 to 2016 (HINAS in Dolonen 2018).
Moreover, the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO) reports a sharp 
decline in the number of hours invoiced in 2009 and further decline from 2013 by its 
TWA member companies in the health and care sector. That category includes hospitals 
as well as the municipal health sector, and not only nursing staff (NHO Service 2017). 
According to one of the TWA managers, there are a few smaller, local TWAs in the 
municipal sector that are not NHO members.
Although the available statistical data have their limitations, one of the character-
istics of the relationship between health institutions and TWAs are signs of decline and 
constrained growth in the use of agency nurses since the peak year of 2009. Another 
important feature is the significant drop in the number of Swedish agency nurses in 
Norway, from 1629 in 2010 to 551 in 2014 and further down to 202 in 2016 (SSB 
2015–2017). In contrast, the number of immigrant and nonresidential Swedish nurses 
increased from 1835 to 2199 between 2010 and 2014 (SSB 2011–2014), underscoring 
the tendency to bank nursing. For 2012–2016, expenditure on agency nursing in the 
hospital sector equals 530 nurse work years a year, or 1.7% of the total number of nurse 
work years in the hospitals (based on HINAS in Dolonen 2018). 
According to the Work Environment Act (WEA), it is permitted by law to hire out 
labor, but hiring in labor is permitted only when the work is of a temporary nature, 
and as a temporary replacement for another person. Additionally, the Act permits tem-
porary work in cases where there are considerable seasonal fluctuations in the amount 
of work to be done, and when there are major unpredictable increases in ordinary 
work tasks. The restrictions on hiring in labor also apply to labor from TWAs (Lov-
data 2014). In 2008, regulations on wages and working conditions in public contracts 
stated that the client firm shall require that the employees of their contractors and 
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subcontractors get wages and working conditions not inferior to the applying national 
tariff agreement, or what is otherwise normal for the place and position in question 
(Lovdata 2008). 
Despite the WEA and the sharpening of the regulations in 2008, the engagement of 
TWAs in the health sector seems to have thrived the first 10 years after the legalization of 
private labor hire (Dahle 2011). In subsequent years, media coverage of illegal working 
conditions and wage conditions may have contributed to sharpen regulatory implemen-
tation. Following a scandal in an Adecco nursing home in 2011 (see Bergene & Egeland 
2016), TWAs came under more pressure to monitor and reduce overtime and it became 
more difficult for the agency nurses to get the amount of overtime that they wanted. 
According to the interviews with the Swedish nurses, the manager of a hospital staffing 
center, and a TWA manager, it was still relatively easy to get overtime for bank nurses in 
the hospital sector, making bank nursing more attractive. This sharpened implementa-
tion of the labor regulations has thus favored bank nursing. 
Agency nursing, bank nursing, and the mobility power of the nurses 
The Norwegian Nurses Organization (NNO) was initially against the legalization of 
private employment exchange and contracting out of labor. Not being able to prevent 
it, the organization changed strategies in 2001–2002 and encouraged agency nursing 
for those who wanted to switch jobs to obtain higher wages and more flexible working 
hours. The objectives were to keep the membership base and use agency nursing as a 
lever to increase wages for the permanently employed (Bergene & Egeland 2016; Dahle 
2011). The NNO managed to establish tariff agreements with nine TWAs in 2001–2002 
resulting in a good increase in the wages of all nurses in 2002 (Skjælaaen 2010). This 
illustrates how mobility power and associational power may enforce each other. How-
ever, one of the TWA managers argued that the agreements became too expensive to the 
TWAs and were thus not renewed.
Since 2011, the NNO has taken an active stand in the public debate that the large 
amount of public money spent on temporary nurses is better spent on permanent posi-
tions (Dolonen 2018). The political Left frequently raises the issue in Parliament (see 
for instance Ministry of Health and Social Care 2016). The counter argument among 
the TWA managers is that the share of nurse work years in agency nursing is too low to 
challenge permanent employment. 
Agency nursing has not become particularly attractive among Norwegian nurses. 
Less than 1% of the Norwegian nurses work for TWAs (Dahle 2011; SSB 2015–2017). 
Pensions are better in the state and municipal sector, although it is possible to negotiate 
higher wages from TWAs. The manager of a hospital staffing center explains that regular 
nurses can easily get additional work and well-paid overtime, if wished, in the institu-
tions where they are employed. Such additional work is included in pension calculations. 
Unlike findings from the UK (De Ruyter et al. 2008; Tailby 2005), the social security 
system and labor regime of the Norwegian welfare state may to some extent act as a 
barrier to agency nursing. In the UK, agency nursing could be a way to avoid overtime 
without overtime payment. However, the financial benefit of agency nursing decreases 
when sick pay, leave entitlements, and pensions in regular positions are accounted for 
(De Ruyter et al. 2008).
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The manager of a hospital staffing center and nurse leaders at the hospital wards 
think that those Norwegian nurses who choose to work for TWAs often do so in order 
to familiarize themselves with the labor market before getting a permanent 100% posi-
tion, and to avoid having to work every third weekend. For the Swedish nurses who 
want to combine working time flexibility with more predictability in when, where, and 
how much to work, bank nursing seems to be a better option than agency nursing. Vol-
untary part-time in a permanent position offers less flexibility than agency nursing and 
bank nursing but is a solution for those who want more predictability. This is not to 
miss that involuntary part-time has become a barrier to recruit and retain nurses in the 
Norwegian health sector (The Research Council of Norway 2014). 
Foreign temporary nurses
Because of the limited interest in agency work among Norwegian nurses, TWAs based in 
Norway rely mainly on immigrants or nonresidential nurses from other countries than 
Norway. This group constituted 77% of the agency nurses in 2016 (SSB 2015–2017). 
According to the respondents in the hospital sector, the labor market for agency 
nursing in this sector is predominantly Scandinavian, mainly due to strict language 
requirements. In the hospital sector, TWAs deliver mostly Danish nurses, whereas bank 
nurses are mainly Swedish. The mangers of the hospital staffing centers explain that 
Swedish and Danish nurses are desirable in Norway because of the close similarities in 
language and culture, as well as their nursing skills.
The Swedish nurses in this study use their mobility power to leave the Swedish labor 
market altogether, or they combine a regular, and sometimes part-time, position in Swe-
den with temping in Norway (Kiil 2014). They go to Norway to escape the lower wages, 
demanding work-pace and bureaucratic routines that steal time away from nursing in 
Sweden. Their dissatisfaction started with the introduction of new public management 
in the health sector in the late 1980s. Subsequent financial crises have worsened their 
working conditions and frustration with individual wage setting (Kiil & Knutsen 2016). 
These motivations, as well as the combination of regular and temporary work, resemble 
the case of NHS nurses in the UK (De Ruyter et al. 2008; Purcell et al. 2004; Royal Col-
lege of Nursing & HCL Nursing 2016).
The Swedish agency nurses use their mobility power in Norway too. The HINAS 
agreement (above) lists the TWAs from which Norwegian hospitals may hire health per-
sonnel. The prices increase the further down the lists the hospitals must go to get access 
to persons with the required expertise. If the TWAs in the HINAS agreement are unable 
to deliver, the hospitals may use the spot market, where prices are much higher. Swedish 
agency nurses tell that they can take advantage of this to ‘agency-jump’ for higher wages 
and better working conditions down the list. Being in high demand, they prefer such 
‘agency jumping’ to payment between assignments, which is also the experience of TWA 
managers. While TWAs at the bottom of the list benefit, it increases the cost of agency 
nurses to the health sector. 
The fact that many Swedish nurses have switched to bank nursing is another 
example of their mobility power. Bank nursing has become popular for several reasons: 
Although hourly wages may be lower in bank nursing, the Swedish nurses appreci-
ate the predictability of being able to fill their time in Norway with work, and bank 
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nursing offers good opportunities for extra work with overtime compensation. That 
they often return to the same health institution and ward whenever they go to Norway 
means continuity and familiarization with the workplace. They then feel that they can 
contribute more to the workplace and gain greater acceptance among the regular staff. 
Another advantage is to avoid the hassles of shifting from workplace to workplace in 
different geographical areas of Norway (Swedish nurses). The arguments concerning 
the hassles of agency nursing are similar to findings in the UK (De Ruyter et al. 2008; 
Tailby 2005). 
The mobility power of Swedish nurses has contributed to higher wages for nurses 
in Sweden and high bonuses for nurses who agree to postpone their summer holidays. 
In addition to this, the value of the Norwegian krone started to decline in 2014 (Kiil 
& Knutsen 2016). The Norwegian labor market has become less lucrative and Swedish 
nurses demonstrate their mobility power by ‘returning’ to the Swedish labor market, as 
reflected in the declining number of Swedish agency nurses in Norway (SSB 2015–2017 
above). Moreover, the mobility power that the ‘remaining’ Swedish bank nurses get when 
a large number has left enables them to set specific demands, like maximum 4–5 days 
of work but with extra shifts, to get the most out of their time in Norway, as explained 
by one of the nurse leaders in a hospital ward.
The Danish financial crisis in 2008 led to unemployment and the Danish Nurses 
Council (DNC) encouraged nurses to find work abroad, either by TWAs or directly.7 A 
number of Danish TWAs have signed agreements with the DNC on wages, paid travel 
(time and expenses), accommodation, and insurances.8 Moreover, one of the TWA man-
agers claims that the Danish nurses can earn more if they are posted by a Danish TWA 
than if they are directly employed in Norway. The role of the DNC exemplifies how 
associational power enables mobility power. 
Norway is a wealthy country with high income from its oil and gas resources and 
has thus been more resilient to financial crises than Sweden and Denmark. This explains 
why Norway can benefit from temporary nurses from the two other Nordic welfare 
states.
Experiences and strategies of the health institutions
Both before and after the institutionalization of external labor hire from TWAs, Nor-
wegian health institutions have employed various measures for dealing with shortages: 
small part-time positions, temporary positions, on-call substitutes and holiday extras, 
as well as overtime and extra work among the regular staff, to secure access to nurses. 
Health workers may also step in for absent nurses (Dahle & Midthus Østbye 2011; 
Gautun et al. 2016). 
Agency nursing is referred to as the choice of last resort by the respondents both in 
the hospital sector and nursing homes. The main objections to agency nursing are that 
high costs and discontinuity in personnel can impair the quality of nursing. To illustrate 
this, nurse leaders explain that the median hourly pay for a full-time specialist hospital 
nurse in 2017 is NOK 283 per hour,9 whereas a specialist agency nurse might cost NOK 
700–800 an hour ‘all inclusive’ (wages, margins, travel, and accommodation). Accord-
ing to the head of a ward with general and specialist nurses, an agency nurse would cost 
NOK 5000–8000 per shift. 
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It is the wards that must accommodate the cost of agency nurses in their tight bud-
gets. It thus happens that wards occasionally decline to take the agency nurses offered 
by the staffing centers. Leaders at the hospital-ward level and a manager at a hospital 
staffing center confirm this. One nurse leader in a hospital ward spoke of agency nurs-
ing as waste of scarce resources: directly employed nurses cost less, and provide greater 
continuity. Another nurse leader mentioned problems like lack of familiarity with the 
internal routines, and that agency nurses need time to acquaint themselves with the new 
workplaces, learning new routines and practices, before they can work independently, 
which affects both the productivity of the nurses and the quality of work. This is in 
line with findings from other countries (Castle 2009; Jansson & Engström 2017; May 
et al. 2006).
Unpredictability concerning who the institutions get and whether the agency 
nurses can get down to work immediately is of great concern: ‘If we get the wrong 
person, this means a heavy burden on the others, as this person would need a lot of 
help with medication and reporting’ (nurse leader, hospital ward). A nurse leader in a 
ward with many specialist nurses told that they use agency nurses who are new to the 
ward only from Monday to Friday, when there are many experienced nurses on duty. 
The problem is that they need agency nurses in the weekends too: ‘Nurses on call who 
can cover during weekends and in cases of sickness absence are worth their weight in 
gold’ (nurse leader, hospital ward). When the wards place their orders, they may ask 
for nurses that they know from before, but many may be competing for the same expe-
rienced nurses. Nurse leaders in wards in need of specialist nurses also argue that the 
best TWAs are those with the highest delivery capacity and that specialize in supplying 
specialist nurses. Unfortunately, these agencies are found further down the HINAS list 
and are expensive. It is a source of frustration that the TWAs cannot always deliver the 
type of nurses requested by the institutions, particularly as regards specialist nurses for 
hospitals. According to the nurse leaders in the hospital wards and the managers of the 
nursing homes, it can also be difficult for hospitals and nursing homes to get agency 
nurses on short notice.
Since 2003–2004, the hospital staffing centers to coordinate the use of agency nurses 
have become increasingly important in the direct hire of temporary nurses and establish-
ment of personnel pools for bank nursing (Dahle & Midthus Østbye 2007; Skjælaaen 
2010). Pools have also emerged in nursing homes, but according to the managers, they 
are not primarily to replace agency nursing. 
In a project launched by the government in 2010 to experiment with measures to 
reduce involuntary part time, establishing pools for permanently employed nurses was 
widely used in nursing homes. A nursing-home manager referred to this and told that 
representatives of health institutions discuss experiences with various pooling solutions 
that could be helpful in recruiting and retaining personnel as part of the ‘big full-time 
choice’.
One nursing home gets long-term substitutes from a pool at the municipal level, 
using its own pool of permanently employed nurses to cover for short-term leave. Using 
their own pool is more efficient than on-call lists, in terms of continuity as well as admin-
istration. In addition, it offers better control of personnel use and thus less risk of using 
temporary nurses to such an extent that permanent employment must be offered. The 
manager claims that this nursing home has become less dependent on expensive agency 
nurses too. Based on secondary data, another nursing home explains ‘… [we] now have 
 Nordic journal of working life studies Volume 8  ❚  Number 4  ❚  December 2018 37
qualified personnel on fixed wages where we previously used assistants, overtime or 
external TWAs …’ (Brandshaug 2017, p. 3, author’s translation). The costs of adminis-
tering the pool are minimal compared with how much is saved on personnel expenses. 
Savings on personnel expenses and less use of TWAs are echoed in the interviews with 
managers of other nursing homes where this type of pool has been tried. 
For cost-related reasons, continuity of personnel and to some extent predictability, 
the nurse leaders of the hospital wards and the nursing-home managers prefer regular 
nurses working extra hours, bank nurses, and other internal solutions to agency nurses, 
but the internal solutions are not sufficient to cover the nurse shortages. Hospital staffing 
centers say they would find it hard to manage without TWAs, especially in the summer: 
‘In the summer there is a war going on between the hospitals fighting for nurses’ (man-
ager, hospital staffing center). In addition, there is the problem of competition among 
hospitals in recruiting specialist nurses for vacant positions. In the nursing homes too, 
the managers argue that TWAs are good to have in the hour of need. More importantly, 
the manager of a hospital staffing center emphasizes that they must be careful not to 
undermine the TWAs with their own pool of temp nurses.
Experiences and strategies of the TWAs
Seen from the TWA sector, the public sector is both extremely price-conscious and 
requires proper working conditions and wages. The TWA managers appreciate the lat-
ter but complain that that the combination results in low margins for serious TWAs. 
The wide scope of the HINAS agreement makes it risky not to take part in it. Inclusion 
in the agreement, without any negative marks for performance, could also be an asset 
in the market. HINAS/Hospital Procurement has a reputation for being more quality-
conscious than the municipal sector. However, some TWAs find that they can do better 
on the spot market or opt out because they find pre-qualification requirements and audit 
too cumbersome. Those that cannot comply have to find assignments for lower quality 
conscious institutions and small municipalities where control is laxer. 
A further challenge is that hospitals in Norway started cutting on long-term hire of 
agency nurses already around the year 2005, to save money (Dahle & Midthus Østbye 
2007). According to one of the TWA managers, the resultant many one-day TWA com-
missions require considerable administration. They are not very attractive to agency 
nurses either, and Swedish nurses report that they use their mobility power to shift to 
bank nursing for more continuity in their assignments. 
Bank nursing
Establishment of staffing centers and development of bank nursing have developed into 
a situation of competition and cooperation between the TWAs and the hospitals, as 
confirmed in one of the TWAs. The competitive element appears less distinctive accord-
ing to the interviews with the nursing-home managers. The establishment of personnel 
pools is a more recent phenomenon and there is no ‘HINAS agreement’ here. However, 
also in this sector, cost and quality concerns make many nursing homes reluctant to use 
agency nurses. 
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As argued by a manager in one of the TWAs, staffing centers and bank nursing do 
not represent the full solution to the staffing problems. The TWAs have expertise in 
obtaining nurses that can be hard to find, like specialist nurses and nurses that must be 
recruited from abroad; moreover, they can send them to different parts of Norway as 
and when required. The staffing centers follow procedures that make agency nursing 
more transparent, which the managers of the TWAs find positive. However, staffing 
centers, being an additional link in the supply chain, could lead to delays in accessing 
nurses. Moreover, last-minute orders are difficult to fill if the clients specifically request 
nurses they have used previously. This emerging problem of matching short-notice deliv-
ery and nurses with experience from the workplace exposes a structural challenge of 
agency nursing.
The huge shortage of nurses predicted for the coming years because of the growing 
elderly population is an important motivation for TWAs to remain in the market for 
temporary nurses. One TWA has opted to remain in the market until demand picks up, 
serving both the hospital sector and the municipal sector. Another manager in a TWA 
that is deeply involved in supplying the municipal sector explains that their choice is 
a result of what the nurses they access can do and want to do. Hospitals require lon-
ger work experience and more advanced language skills. However, with the increasing 
demand for long-term assignments in hospitals in more peripheral areas, this is also a 
promising market segment: ‘Clients are in enormous need [of nurses]. This [the health 
sector] is the right place to be’ (manager, TWA). 
Responding to mobility power
Based on the interviews with the TWA managers, the difficulties in recruiting Norwe-
gian nurses to the health sector, together with the declining participation of Swedish 
nurses in the Norwegian labor market have prompted TWAs to search for nurses in 
Southern and Eastern Europe. A TWA pursing this strategy also provides longer and 
better language training and thereby deepens its relationship with the nurses. Accord-
ing to the TWA manager, follow up at work by a contact person also deepens the 
relationship.
Another strategy involves tapping into the Norwegian labor market and motivating 
nurses who would otherwise leave nursing to remain, as well as motivating those who 
have left to return. A manager in a TWA that does this tells that the TWA seeks to deepen 
its relationship with the nurses, stressing the opportunities for a better work–life balance 
in its recruitment strategy: Nurses can avoid inconvenient shifts and decide themselves 
what/how many weekends to work. This strategy can be seen as a response to the Nor-
wegian nurses’ mobility power in dealing with some of the problems nurses have with 
working conditions in regular employment. The manager argues that the TWA does 
not want to compete with permanent employment, but seeks to offer different ways of 
being part of the labor market, thereby helping to solve the nursing shortage. However, 
somebody has to take the inconvenient shifts that the health institutions already struggle 
to staff. When agency nursing became attractive to nurses in the UK, this exacerbated 
the internal staffing problems of the NHS (Purcell et al. 2004). As yet, however, combin-
ing regular nursing with agency nursing does not seem to have gained much ground in 
Norway.
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Conclusion
A relationship of cooperation and competition has evolved between Norwegian health 
institutions and TWAs with the growth of bank nursing. To the health institutions, 
this entails reluctant dependence on TWAs. Negative experiences with agency nursing 
regarding costs, productivity, and quality in the Norwegian welfare state parallel find-
ings in international studies (Castle 2009, Jansson & Engström 2017; May et al. 2006), 
suggesting that these problems are largely inherent to agency nursing as such. 
Some health institutions in Norway have introduced bank nursing and personnel 
pools for permanently employed nurses seeing these as better solutions to their staffing 
problems than agency nursing. However, they also acknowledge that they still need agency 
nurses. Statistical data indicate that agency nursing in Norway has been leveling out. 
Sharpening implementation of the regulations in the highly regulated Norwegian 
labor market together with higher requirements in the HINAS agreement reduce the 
TWAs room of maneuver. Another aspect of the Norwegian labor regime is that nurses 
earn higher pensions in the public-sector health institutions than the TWAs, which may 
limit their interest in agency nursing. Sharpening regulatory implementation resulting 
from media coverage and public pressure can be attributed to norms and values in the 
welfare state, but has not been examined as such in this study.
The constrained growth of agency nursing cannot, however, be fully explained with-
out attention to the mobility power of the nurses. In the hospital sector, many of the 
Swedish nurses have used their mobility power to switch from agency nursing to bank 
nursing. To the nurses, bank nursing is less stressful and more predictable for filling their 
time in Norway with work and they can obtain more overtime. To the employers, bank 
nursing is more predictable and flexible than agency nursing. Bank nurses are ready at 
hand and willing to work extra hours when unexpected situations arise. In addition, it 
is less costly and ensures more continuity of staff.
The sharpest decline in the number of hours worked by agency nurses occurred 
between 2014 and 2016, coinciding with when Swedish nurses found it less lucrative to 
go to Norway. This indicates that the decline in agency nursing in the hospital sector is 
not only a matter of bank nursing and other hospital-internal measures to avoid expen-
sive agency nursing: Access to foreign agency nurses is vulnerable to changing condi-
tions and contingencies, in the country of temporary work itself, and in the homelands 
of the nurses. With attention to mobility power, the political economy of employment 
relations approach becomes more sensitive to context at different geographical levels, 
which is particularly important in an international labor market.
What is the future for the TWAs? Will they find themselves recruiting new tempo-
rary nurses, providing language training and introducing them to the Norwegian labor 
market, only to see the best of them ‘disappear’ into the banks of Norway’s health 
institutions? The TWAs acknowledge the competition from the health institutions, but 
argue that existing and predicted nursing shortages make the health sector an interesting 
sector to operate in. 
As in the UK case (Purcell et al. 2004), two of the TWAs react by deepening their 
relationship with the nurses, whether by providing more thorough language training 
and follow-up at work or by attracting Norwegian nurses by offering advantages such 
as a better work–life balance. Another strategy involves expansion within the munici-
pal sector where requirements to TWAs and agency nurses are still lower than in the 
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hospital sector. In some cases, the municipal sector has followed the hospital sector in 
establishing internal personnel pools, and a few municipalities have been seeking advice 
from Hospital Partner on contract negotiations with TWAs. These pools are established 
for better utilization of regular staff, not necessarily to attract temporary nurses, but 
they are reported to reduce expenditures on agency nursing.
The TWA sector is under pressure from two sides: the health institutions, through 
the HINAS requirements and the nurses, who with their mobility power, have stimulated 
bank nursing. Pressure notwithstanding, in view of the predicted demand for nurses by 
2035, personnel banks and pools seem unlikely to render TWAs superfluous. Recruit-
ment of non-Scandinavian nurses and language training will require resources that the 
health institutions do not have today. In 2017, applications to nursing colleges surged, 
but educational capacity must be expanded; moreover, it is too early to know whether 
the new generation of trained nurses will remain in the health sector. Important fac-
tors here are political priorities and budgetary allocations for higher wages, more full-
time positions, and less stressful working conditions that can attract and help to retain 
nurses in permanent positions. Attention to the mobility power of nurses underscores 
the importance of addressing these challenges, not only in order to retain the permanent 
nurses but also to attract temporary nurses when this is necessary.
In addressing mobility power as a form of structural power, it is also important 
to take associational power into account. The study has revealed how associational 
power enables and enforces the mobility power of Danish nurses who go to Norway. It 
has also showed how mobility power and associational power enforced each other in 
the Norwegian nurses’ struggle for higher wages in 2002. The broad concept of mobil-
ity power including those who leave the labor market in addition to those who move 
between health institutions, provides a more complete understanding of the power being 
exercised on the employers.
Norway has benefited from the mobility power of nurses in countries with lower 
wages and less desirable working conditions. However, attention to nurses’ mobility 
power also reveals how vulnerable health institutions become in their dependence on 
temporary foreign nurses if conditions in Norway or the countries of origin change. 
And, as argued by Purcell et al. (2004) in the case of the UK, if growing frustration with 
working conditions leads nurses to combine permanent positions with agency work, this 
may exacerbate the problems of internal staffing. 
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